Abstract. In the context of a "beauty contest" coordination game (in which payoffs 1 depend on the quadratic distance of actions from an unobserved state variable and 2 from the average action) players choose how much costly attention to pay to vari- 
A player 's pure strategy is a pair {z , A (·)} where z is the information-acquisition com- 
208
The parameter γ ∈ (−1, 1) determines a player's concern for aligning with others (the case a player wishes to differ from others. Nevertheless, the restriction |γ| < 1 is imposed;
212
if |γ| > 1 then a strategy-revision process driven by best replies is explosive, and some of 213 the analysis reported throughout the paper fails. 2 The final component of (1) is the cost 214 of acquiring, transmitting, and processing information. Throughout most of the paper 215 the cost function C(z ) is assumed to be increasing, convex, and differentiable. ever, when information-processing constraints are explicitly incorporated (in Section 8) a 217 different formulation for information-acquisition costs is considered.
218
Before moving on to describe the information sources available to players, the general 219 specification of (1) is related to the motivating example from the introduction to the paper:
This is easy to see in a complete-information model. If θ is known then a player's unique best reply to an average actionā taken by others is a = (1 − γ)θ + γā, and the unique Nash equilibrium is for all players to choose a = θ. However, consider a strategy-revision process comprising myopic best replies. Specifically, begin with a strategy profile in which the average action is a (0) = θ. If all players adopt a myopic best reply to this then they will all take the action a
(1) satisfying a (1) − θ = γ(a (0) − θ). Repeating this step k times readily yields a (k) − θ = γ k (a (0) − θ). This process explodes if |γ| > 1.
an application in which a supplier's demand depends on the state of the marketplace 221 and the average price amongst competitors. For this application, a is the price set by 222 supplier ,ā is the industry-wide average price amongst others, and θ is a demand-shock 223 parameter. A simple linear specification for the demand q for 's product is 224 q = (2 − β)θ − a + βā,
225 for some positive parameter β < 1, where the coefficient (2 − β) on θ is a convenient (for 226 algebraic purposes) rescaling of the demand-shift parameter. Setting costs to zero (with 227 no loss of insight) it is straightforward to confirm that a supplier's profit satisfies
229
Notice that the final two terms are independent of supplier 's price a and so are strate-230 gically irrelevant; they may be safely neglected, leaving only the first two quadratic-loss 231 terms. It is easy to see that the remaining components of a supplier's profit in (3) combine
232
to take the form of the payoffs in (1); to do this, simply define γ = β/2. Thus, in this
233
context γ indexes the importance of others' prices relative to its own price on a supplier's 234 demand; if others' prices are irrelevant, so that β = γ = 0, then the coordination motive 235 absent. Note also that a restriction is endogenously imposed upon the parameter γ. As 236 competitors' prices have less impact upon demand than a supplier's own price (so β < 1),
237
it must be that γ < 1 2
, a point returned to in later sections.
238
Before moving on, two technical issues are briefly discussed. Firstly, the player set is a 239 unit mass and so each individual is negligible. In the context of the example above, the 240 continuum-of-players specification implies that each price-setting supplier is best thought 241 of as a monopolistic competitor rather than an oligopolist. The unit-mass assumption 242 serves mainly to simplify exposition, but is not crucial to the results. Appropriately mod-243 ified, many messages emerging from the paper carry over to a world with a finite number 244 of players.
245
Secondly, a player's payoff depends on the average actionā taken across all players.
246
(Equivalently, given the unit-mass-of-players assumption, this is the average taken across 247 all other players apart from player .) Of course, this average is not always well-defined. 4 
248
However, for the class of equilibria considered later in the paper (specifically, those in 249 which the action chosen by a player is a linear function of the informative signals ob-250 served) the average remains well defined both in equilibrium and following a single-251 player deviation. Furthermore, the specification of the game may be completed by plac-252 ing payoffs on the extended real line and setting u = −∞ wheneverā does not exist. The appendix to Myatt and Wallace (2008) demonstrates the changes needed to consider an L-player version of beauty-contest games of the kind considered here. That paper does not include endogenous information acquisition, but otherwise uses the same informational environment and structure studied here. 4 For example, consider a strategy profile in which players choose actions which form a Cauchy distribution across the player set. The mean of the Cauchy does not exist, and soā is not well-defined. ket researcher from supplier . Furthermore, if the supplier faces a price-per-interview 
it more correlated with others' observations of i (the correlation coefficient ρ i increases).
302
The specification (4) and transformations (6) can be related to established models in the to the "private" signal from the two-source world of Morris and Shin (2002) . In contrast,
307
the case ρ i = 1, obtained in the limit as z i → ∞ or by setting ξ 2 i = 0, so that players' 308 observations coincide, corresponds to the "public" signal of Morris and Shin (2002) .
309
For general values of κ 2 i , ξ 2 i , and z i a signal's correlation satisfies 0 < ρ i < 1 so the signal is 310 neither purely private nor purely public. As noted above, the correlation coefficient (and 311 hence publicity of a signal) is both endogenous and also directly linked to the precision 312 of a signal. In particular, the correlation coefficient vanishes as the attention paid to an 313 information source shrinks to zero. What this means is that as a player begins to acquire 314 information from a source, so that z i moves up from zero, the signal is initially private in 315 nature, and only becomes more public as increasing attention is devoted to it.
316
Two further technical issues are mentioned before concluding this section. Firstly, a sig-317 nal's distribution is not properly specified when a player chooses z i = 0. However, this 318 does not cause any particular problems since, as noted above, choosing z i = 0 is equiv-319 alent to ignoring an information source. Secondly, for ξ 2 i > 0 obtaining a perfectly public 320 signal is impossible. However, this can be resolved by extending the choice of informa-321 tion acquisition to include z i = ∞, so long as the cost lim z i →∞ C(z ) is well-defined. This contrasts with the specifications used by Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) . Their players either acquire a signal or do not. This is equivalent to restricting a player's choice of z i to take only two values. They also considered a specification in which a player's information-acquisition decision is continuous. However, that specification insists that the correlation coefficient does not change with the information acquired. In the model proposed here, this is equivalent to assuming that a signal's correlation coefficient remains bounded away from zero even when hardly any attention is paid to it. As Section 10 explains, it is this feature which is responsible for the presence of multiple linear equilibria in their model.
EQUILIBRIUM

323
A player's strategy {z , A (·)} specifies the action A (x ) taken in response to each pos-324 sible signal realisation x . There are good reasons to follow the established literature by 325 focusing on strategies in which a player's action A (x ) is a linear function of the signal 326 realisations. To see why, suppose that all others use a strategy {z, A(·)}. Differentiating 327 the quadratic objective function confirms that player 's best-reply action is (Dewan and Myatt, 2008) .
A strategy is linear if there are weights w ∈ R n such that
linearity, a player's strategy takes the form {z , w }, and it is straightforward to confirm 340 that in the context of an equilibrium strategy employ a strategy {z, w} then the expected payoff of a player choosing {z , w } is
345 6 Note that a player's forecast of the average action is equivalent to the forecast of the action of an arbitrary player = . The average action isā
The expectation in the integrand does not depend on the particular label , and so
Of course, a = A(x ), which upon substitution yields the final term of (7). 7 Morris and Shin (2002) claimed that the linear equilibrium of a beauty-contest game is unique. Angeletos and Pavan (2007, fn. 5) observed that their logic is not watertight. Dewan and Myatt (2008) proved uniqueness within the class of strategies which (as described here) do not stray too far from linearity; their approach could be extended to strategies which do not diverge from a finite-term polynomial strategy. A second approach is to consider a related game in which state, signal, and action spaces are bounded, and show that the unique equilibrium converges to the unique linear equilibrium of an unbounded game as the various bounds are removed (Calvó-Armengol, de Martí Beltran, and Prat, 2009 ). Finally, arguments from the classic study of team-decision problems (Radner, 1962) can be exploited: for an appropriately specified finite-player version of the game considered here, and given the introduction of an appropriate proper and normal prior, the unique symmetric strategy profile which maximises the ex ante expected payoff of a randomly chosen player is the unique linear equilibrium. Contrary to some claims within the literature, it seems that a full uniqueness proof is unavailable. This is because there are some strategy profiles for which payoffs are not defined; footnote 4 mentions Cauchy-distributed actions as an example.
8
Appendix A also contains various calculations, such as the derivation of (8), omitted from the main text.
Given that others play linearly (and, following the discussion in footnote 7, there is little 346 if any loss of generality by supposing that they do) a player's best reply is to choose a pair 347 of vectors {z , w } to maximise (8) subject to the constraint n i=1 w i = 1. An inspection 348 confirms that (8) is strictly concave, and a player's best reply is unique.
349
Before characterising a player's best reply and the unique symmetric linear equilibrium 350 to the beauty-contest game, the components of (8) the desire to differ if γ < 0) then L † (w , w) attracts the coefficient γ.
369
Notice that L † (w , w) disappears when players use the same strategy. Furthermore, begin-
370
ning from a symmetric strategy profile, changes in a player's strategy have no first-order 371 effect on L † (w , w), and so when considering a local deviation a player needs only to con-372 sider the effect of that deviation on L (w , z ) and C(z ). E[u ] is concave in w and z , and 373 so consideration of local deviations is all that is needed. This means that in a symmetric 374 equilibrium each player acts as though minimising L (w , z ) + C(z ). These observations 375 form a useful lemma.
376
Lemma 1. A strategy {z, w} forms a symmetric equilibrium if and only if it solves
378
This lemma relies upon the maintained assumption that C(·) is convex. Such convex-379 ity ensures that the first-order conditions from maximisation of E [u ] in the context of 380 a symmetric equilibrium successfully solve (9). However, if C(·) is not convex then 381 an equilibrium strategy {w, z} can only be guaranteed to generate a local minimum of 
391 and whereψ i = 0 for any information source which is ignored (so that z i = w i = 0).
392
The weight attached to a particular signal is large when that signal is listened to care- 
408
The precision ψ i ≡ 1/σ 2 i measures how the ith signal informs a player about the funda- choices of signal i relative to signal j is given by
413
Thus the relative influence is the product of two terms. The first ratio is the precision of 414 the ith signal relative to the jth. Notice that this is all that matters when γ = 0. The second 415 ratio measures the relative publicity of the signals; when γ > 0, so that coordination is desirable, this drives influence toward the signal with the higher correlation coefficient.
417
Signals that are more public (more highly correlated) are more useful for the players' 418 coordination motive. 9 When γ < 0 (coordination is undesirable) the reverse is true.
419
The next three sections of the paper examine the properties of the equilibrium described 
INFORMATION ACQUISITION
426
The main focus of this paper is on the introduction of endogenous information acquisition
427
to an otherwise-standard beauty contest, and so the determinants of z (the information-428 acquisition policy) are now considered. Taking (10) and substituting yields, for z i > 0,
where
430
Treating K i as a constant for the moment, (13) This discussion of (13) treats K i as a constant; but of course it is not. Nevertheless, with In related work Myatt and Wallace (2008) called the term
The focus there is on the macroeconomic island-economy parable and follows closely in the spirit of Morris and Shin (2002) . As a result the restriction γ ≥ 0 holds and so β i is increasing in ρ i . Thus the notion of publicity conveniently captures the correlation of signals across 'islands'. The emphasis is on macroeconomic performance in the presence of informative announcements about θ by a social planner (for instance, a central bank), treated as an additional signal. Since there are no players-the beauty-contest game is only a useful isomorphism-it does not make sense to speak of objective functions, and so endogenous information acquisition cannot be incorporated into that framework immediately. Nevertheless, the informational structure there can be recovered in the current paper by (for example) setting z i = 1 for all i and .
this fits well with the interpretation of z i as a sample size, so that the precision of the ob- well be subject to high-variance sender noise.
459
Given this specific form for the cost function, the marginal cost of information acquisition 
467
Only the clearest signals (those that satisfy ξ i < K) receive attention. Other things equal, signals 468 with better accuracy receive more attention; raising the marginal-cost schedule c (·) reduces the 469 attention paid to all signals; and the attention paid to a signal is non-monotonic in its clarity.
470
The number of signals which attract attention falls as the marginal-cost schedule rises, as the 471 accuracy of information sources improves, and as coordination becomes more important. When γ 472 is sufficiently close to one then only one signal (the clearest) receives attention. and exerting very little influence) so long as its clarity is sufficient.
480
10
Ties are excluded for convenience only. The propositions and proofs could be extended to accommodate ties (in a straightforward but cumbersome manner) but no fresh insight would be gained.
This feature is usefully understood by considering the marginal benefit to increased at-481 tention. Differentiating the quadratic-loss term from (9) it is readily verified that 
493
Another notable feature of Proposition 2 is that the attention paid to a signal is non-494 monotonic in its clarity. Directly this is because the marginal benefit from increased atten-495 tion paid to a signal is small whenever the signal is opaque (ξ signal. The fact that attention is non-monotonic in clarity reflects the fact that optimised 504 expenditure on a product is non-monotonic in its price.
505
This discussion suggests that it is the properties of the first bit of a signal, as z i rises away 506 from zero, that determine whether an information source is used. This is also true for 507 a second natural specification in which the cost function is additively separable, so that tion sources improves and as coordination becomes more important to the players.
521
The first claim does not imply that only a strict subset of signals are acquired; it is possible 522 that all n information sources receive attention. However, those that receive no attention 523 are the ones that are (perhaps unsurprisingly) the most expensive at the initial margin.
524
Related results also hold. For instance, it is natural to say that information source i is Consider a world in which n = 2 and where m = 1; given that ξ 2 1 < ξ 2 2 it is always possible to construct such a scenario by choosing 1 − γ sufficiently small. Increasing ξ 2 1 up to ξ 2 2 will raise m, as certainly both signals are acquired whenever their clarities are equal. Also, when ξ 2 1 is lowered toward zero then m also rises. (Technically, some other conditions need to be imposed for this to be true; it is sufficient to impose an Inada condition on c (·) by supposing that c (0) = 0.) The reason is that the first signal becomes almost free to listen to: this reduces z 1 and so lowers the marginal cost of paying attention to the second information source. Drawing these observations together, there is no monotonic relationship between m and ξ 2 i . however, reveal fully the amount of attention paid to each source as parameters change.
551
Although more signals are acquired as the coordination motive weakens and as the accu-552 racy of signals falls, it is not the case that each signal receives more individual attention.
553
Indeed, for many specifications (including those in this section) any change in accuracy 554 or the coordination motive which raises the attention given to one signal must necessar-555 ily reduce the attention paid to another.
13 Before describing how the pattern of attention 556 changes, however, it is useful to consider the notion of a signal's publicity. The final comparative-static prediction is natural: attention falls away from poorer quality 581 information sources. The effect of the coordination motive is more interesting, however: 582 the change in the attention paid to an information source depends upon the associated 583 signal's publicity, but this publicity is itself endogenous. In particular, as γ rises attention 584 moves away from relatively private (uncorrelated) signals and so, as an inspection of (11) 585 13 This statement holds, for instance, whenever the cost function satisfies ∂ 2 C(z)/∂z i ∂z j ≥ 0.
14 The first of these features is also present in Myatt and Wallace (2008) ; however, the endogenous information acquisition which is the central theme of this paper is absent from their model. confirms, those signals become less correlated and so even more private; at the same time, 586 the greater attention paid to the relatively public signals (that is, the highly correlated sig-587 nals) makes them even more public by increasing their correlation coefficients. In essence, 588 the heightened coordination motive spreads out the pattern of signals' publicities.
589
Since the correlation coefficients of signals (their publicities) are endogenous, it is inter-590 esting to consider how the exogenous properties of an information source, namely its 591 underlying accuracy and its clarity, determine its equilibrium publicity. Given the use 592 of the additive-attention specification for costs, so that C(z) = c( n j=1 z j ), this is readily 593 determined. To see this, notice that the correlation coefficient of the ith signal satisfies
595
where the second equality is obtained by substituting in the solution for z i from (14).
596
Notice that the effect of the signal-accuracy term κ and so players spend less on information acquisition as their desire to coordinate strengthens.
603
The final claim is obtained by straightforward algebraic manipulations. The total atten-604 tion Z becomes constant once γ is large enough for only one signal to receive attention.
605
The comparative-static results relating to γ may be recast in terms of the accuracy of the actions are interpreted as investment decisions. Angeletos and Pavan (2007) whereas the conditional variance var[a |ā, θ] falls.
643
As the truth becomes less important and coordination more so, the correlation between 644 players' actions rises, but they take actions that vary more around θ. Moreover, this result others do not, they will take increasingly uncorrelated actions (but based on the same 647 information sources). This is despite the fact that, for small γ, the very strong preference 648 to hit θ drives the variability of actions around θ down.
649
The properties of players' posterior beliefs also change with the coordination motive. Pre- Put rather more crudely, when players become more concerned with coordination then 661 they tend to believe the wrong thing about θ, but at least they believe it together; in 662 essence, their beliefs become more public (correlated) in nature.
663
Notice that the linear form of the cost function used in Propositions 6 and 7 fits with the 664 market-research story; it corresponds to the case where there is a constant marginal cost 665 of interviewing each additional surveyed consumer. Furthermore, the condition γ < 1 2 666 used in Proposition 7 is automatically satisfied in the industry-supply setting; as Section 2 667 noted, this inequality corresponds to the assumption that the demand for a product is 668 more sensitive to its own price than to the industry-wide average price. In the industry-supply scenario from the introduction and elsewhere in the paper, the 671 cost of information acquisition is interpreted as a supplier paying for market researchers 672 to survey various market segments. As noted in the previous section, if there were some 673 fixed price per interview then a linear specification for C(·) might be natural. However,
674
another view of the costs of information acquisition is suggested by the "rational inatten-675 tion" literature. Here, the costs can be associated with the transmission, evaluation, and 676 incorporation of the information into the decision-making process.
677
The rational inattention literature (Sims, 2010 , provides a recent survey) supposes that 678 there is a constraint on the information that may be processed (transmitted, evaluated, 679 and so forth). It uses ideas from information theory (Cover and Thomas, 2006; MacKay, 680 2003) to model this. For data with a finite support the relevant concept is Shannon capac-681 ity (or Shannon entropy), which is in turn related to coding theory. Given a probability 682 distribution over messages that could be sent, a coding system may be constructed (the following such an observation is the mutual information between x and y, labelled I(x, y),
Somewhat more precisely, entropy provides a lower bound to this length, and the use of an optimal coding algorithm achieves an average message length within one "bit" of the entropy. and has the property I(x, y) = H(x) − H(x | y) = H(y) − H(y | x). The mutual information 697 is a measure of how much bandwidth is needed to transmit the data required to update 698 beliefs from (in an obvious notation) F (x) to F (x | y).
699
The differential entropy takes a convenient form when a variable is normally distributed.
700
If x is an n-dimensional multivariate normal distribution then
702 where det[Ω x ] is the determinant of the covariance matrix Ω x . If y is another n-dimensional 703 random variable and x and y are joint normally distributed then
705
where Ω x | y is the covariance matrix for the conditional distribution. The formula (18) 
711
Note that with a diffuse prior, the prior entropy is undefined, and so a proper prior must 
717
and also, when expressed in terms of the variance σ 2 i and correlation ρ i , satisfies
719
The mutual information is increasing and concave in the information-acquisition choice z.
720
The first two terms in (20) is strictly concave in z (Lemma 2) and (for n ≥ 2) a cost function based on it cannot 744 be convex. The discussion following Lemma 1 indicates that finding an equilibrium no 745 longer corresponds to solving the minimisation problem of (9) when C(z) is not convex.
746
Recall that for {z, w} to form an equilibrium then given its play by others it should solve
748
(The summations include a 0th term for the prior, where ξ other equilibrium is either a local minimiser or a stationary point of L (w, z) + C(z).
762
17
If an equilibrium is a local maximum then the convexity of L † (w , w) in w must be strong enough to ensure that L (w , z ) + L † (w , w) + C(z ) achieves a local minimum.
Lemma 3 reveals the possibility of multiple equilibria, and so it is useful to find an exam-763 ple that fulfills this possibility. In the presence of a proper prior it is possible to do this by 764 considering a world with only one information source (n = 1). Abusing (but, of course, 765 simplifying) notation slightly, subscripts are dropped here so that the sender and receiver 766 noise variances for this single signal are κ 2 and ξ 2 /z respectively, and the weight placed 767 on this signal in the linear equilibrium strategy is w, so that the remaining weight 1 − w 768 is placed on the prior. Using Proposition 1, these weights satisfy
770
Adopting the cost function C(z) = 2cI(x ,x), so that costs are linearly increasing in the 771 bandwidth required for the transmission of information, when n = 1 the entropy-based 772 cost function takes the particularly simple form
774
while the expected quadratic loss from the beauty-contest components is
776
In these expressions ξ 2 and z only enter as a ratio (this is true more generally when costs 777 are entropy based) and so there is nothing lost by setting ξ 2 = 1 (this is a change in the 778 units of z). Doing so, and substituting the solutions for w and 1 − w, a player's loss as a
781
An examination of L(z) permits the identification of candidate equilibria. For instance, 782 a z which successfully minimises this expression subject to z ≥ 0 will yield a payoff-783 maximising equilibrium (Lemma 3). This approach yields the next result.
784
Proposition 8 (Equilibria with Entropy-Derived Information-Acquisition Costs). Suppose
785
that there is a single information source and that the cost of paying attention to it is linearly 786 increasing in the mutual information, so that C(z) = 2cI(x ,x). Define: (so that the coordination motive is relatively weak) then there is a unique equilibrium.
789
Players acquire no new information (z = w = 0) if and only if c ≥c. is automatically satisfied in the context of the industry-supply example which has been 801 discussed throughout the paper.
802
Nevertheless, Proposition 8 also confirms that multiple equilibria may be present when 803 the coordination motive is strong. This is readily illustrated using the parameters the optimal information acquisition choice is used. It is readily verified that this satisfies
811
The parameter choices made here yield thresholdsc = is put on the signal, and another in which it attracts significant weight.
817
The presence of multiple equilibria and other aspects of the entropy-based cost structure 818 make it difficult to characterise fully the equilibrium set. Nevertheless, some progress 819 can be made. Returning to the general case of n information sources, it is natural to ask: 820 which information sources do players choose to use?
821
The first (and easy) result is that the clarity of an information source, determined by ξ is that better accuracy helps players, and that they choose (in equilibrium) to acquire the 828 signals with better accuracy. This is true, but nonetheless requires a little work.
829
The extra complication arises because increased accuracy raises costs as well as benefits; 
• •w
For n = 1 this figure illustrates the expected loss to a player as a function of the weight w placed on the signal. The cost function C(z) = 2cI(x ,x) is based on the mutual information from Lemma 2. The parameter choices are γ = 4 5 , 2 = 5, κ 2 = 0, and c = 1 4 . The solid line illustrates L (z , w ) + C(z ) as a function of w , where for each w the information acquisition z is chosen optimally. There are two local minima, at w = 0 and w =w > 0 wherew ≈ 0.65. The latter minimum generates a payoff-maximising equilibrium. The dashed lines illustrate L (z , w ) + L † (w , w) + C(z ) for w ∈ {0,w}, and so include the term L † (w , w) which punishes player for deviating from the choice w by others. Including this extra term for w = 0 ensures that w = 0 is a unique best reply from player , and so w = z = 0 is an equilibrium, even though it is not payoff maximising. 
842
The first claim of this proposition is a corollary of the fact that signal accuracy is payoff-843 improving in equilibrium. It means that a player would always find it optimal to swap a 844 lower-accuracy signal for a higher-accuracy alternative.
845
Emerging from this section, then, are two messages which contrast with earlier results. 
RELATED LITERATURE AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
858
Researchers including Shin (2002, 2005) , Hellwig (2005) , and Angeletos and 
19,20 868
18
There are some recent exceptions. Papers which admit a more general signal structure include Myatt and Wallace (2008) , Baeriswyl and Cornand (2006, 2007) , Baeriswyl (2007) , Angeletos and Pavan (2009) , as well as those mentioned below: Dewan and Myatt (2008) and Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009). 19 The small and most directly related literature discussed here is distinct from the contemporaneous literature on dynamic coordination games with endogenous information (Angeletos and Pavan, 2009; Angeletos and La'O, 2009 , for instance). There the endogeneity arises from the fact that agents observe noisy signals of past behaviour which aggregate the dispersed (and exogenous) information available to agents up until that point. However, agents do not choose what to observe nor how carefully to observe it. Related to this literature, various recent contributions use a similar approach to study, for example, asset pricing and informational feedback effects (Ozdenoren and Yuan, 2008) or how the aggregate trading of currency speculators endogenously generates information for a policy maker (Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan, 2011). 20 Another related and interesting strand of literature is the work of Calvó-Armengol and de Martí Beltran (2007, 2009 ) and particularly Calvó-Armengol, de Martí Beltran, and Prat (2009) . In these papers a set of players arranged on a network share information they hold concerning the state of the world with others they are linked to on the network, before playing a beauty contest of the sort studied above. The papers study the impact that the network structure has upon the spread of actions in the game where (in the first two papers) that network structure is exogenous and (in the third paper) the players themselves decide
The model of Dewan and Myatt (2008) is closely related to this one; many of their results
869
are special cases of those presented here. They used a beauty-contest game as a metaphor 870 for a political party. Party members must advocate a policy, and in so doing want to do 871 the right thing for the party (a policy close to θ) while preserving party unity (a policy 872 close to the "party line"). Before making their decisions they listen to leaders. These whether to form pairwise links with other players at some cost, thereby endogenising the network structure and hence the information acquired. Given that extant information is passed between players, the focus of this work is elsewhere, however it is related to the current paper to the extent that information acquisition is endogenous and co-determined with the actions of the underlying beauty contest.
21 Dewan and Myatt (2008) also allowed the properties of information sources to be endogenous by considering the rhetorical strategies of leaders: such leaders vary their clarities (ξ 2 i ) in order to attract attention. 22 In the world of Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) a player either acquires a signal or not. For an acquired signal the variance of the receiver noise is fixed. Within the context of this paper, this is equivalent to specifying, for somez i , a cost function where c i (z i ) = 0 for z i = 0, c i (z i ) =c i for 0 < z i ≤z i , and c i (z i ) = ∞ otherwise. Obviously, this is non-convex and so an ingredient of the uniqueness result in this paper is missing. Although this is a technical reason for the present of multiple equilibria in their model, it is not a useful explanation; they key issue is the exogeneity of the correlation coefficient.
Here there is a more nuanced view. As a player pays more attention to an information 899 source (z i grows) then the correlation of the signal realisations rises too; hence the public-900 ity of a signal, as well as its precision, is under the control of the acquiring player. Thus, 901 implicitly at least, this model endogenises the nature of acquisition as well as the decision 902 to acquire. Crucially, the first bit of a signal acquired is private in nature: the correlation 903 coefficient falls to zero as z i vanishes. This smoothes things out sufficiently to ensure that 904 there is a unique equilibrium. Thus, when Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009, p. 224 ) stated 905 that a requirement for uniqueness is that "the information agents choose to acquire must 906 also be private" they were correct only when the decision is to acquire or not; if play- Multiple equilibria can re-appear with a very different cost specification. The rational-916 inattention literature (Sims, 2003; Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2009) 
924
The take-home message from this paper, then, is that the nature of equilibrium endoge- Proof of Lemma 1. In both the text and the lemma it is claimed that any linear equilibrium strategy satisfies n i=1 w i = 1. To see why, consider a linear equilibrium strategy profile A(x ) = w x , where w is the transpose of w ∈ R n . Given the linearity,
Given normality, the latter conditional expectation satisfies E[x | x ] = Bx where B is a n × n inference matrix with the property that the rows of B sum to one. Similarly, E[θ | x ] = a x where the elements of a ∈ R n also sum to one. Using (7),
, and hence w = (1 − γ)a + γB w. Given that the elements of a sum to one and each column of B sums to one, this equality can only hold if the elements of w sum to one. So, when looking for linear equilibria it is sufficient to look for those satisfying n i=1 w i = 1. Moreover, any best reply to such a strategy also satisfies this equality. Thus it is permissible to impose the constraint n i=1 w i = 1 upon each player when seeking equilibria. To obtain (8), note that n i=1 w i = 1 for player implies that a − θ = n i=1 w i (η i + ε i ), and so
The average action isā = θ + n i=1 η i , since the individual-specific errors disappear via the law of large numbers and so
Substituting these two expressions yields the expression for E [u ] given in (8). Given this solution, the pair {z, w} yield a symmetric equilibrium if and only if {z, w} ∈ arg min
, and where
This combined loss function is strictly convex in its arguments. Thus, the unique solution to the minimisation problem is determined by the relevant first-order conditions. Local to w, however, changes in w have no first-order effect on L † (w , w). Thus the component L † (w , w) can be ignored when dealing with the relevant first-order conditions. This all implies that {z, w} uniquely minimises L (w , z ) + C(z ), subject of course to the constraint
Proof of Proposition 1. The expression for z i can be obtained from the first-order condition with respect to z i . To obtain the solutions for the influence weights w, fix z and note that the optimisation problem is to minimise L ≡ n i=1 (w 2 i /ψ i ) subject to n i=1 w i = 1. A solution must satisfy ∂L /∂w i = ∂L /∂w j for all i = j, which holds if and only if w i ∝ψ i .
It is useful at this point to derive (13) Once the equilibrium weights w have been substituted into the objective function, the solution for z emerges by minimising L (z) + C(z) where
For z i > 0 the first-order condition with respect to z i takes the form
which can be re-arranged to yield (13). (Note that the first-order condition can hold only if ξ i < K i . Furthermore, a solution to the minimisation problem also requires ξ i ≥ K i whenever z i = 0.)
Proof of Proposition 2. ∂C(z)/∂z i = c (Z) for all i and so K i = K for all i. The calculation of (13) noted that ξ i < K i when z i > 0 and ξ i ≥ K i when z i = 0. Given that that K i = K for all i, this implies that the information sources attracting attention are those with the lowest ξ i . This yields the first claim. Substituting the expression for z i from (13) intoψ i yields
The second part of (13) yields 1/K = c (Z) n j=1ψ j . Combining this with (34):
The left-hand side of (35) is increasing in K, and so (35) yields a unique solution for K. This can be used to obtain the solution for the individual attention levels paid to each information source.
Turning to the properties of the equilibrium, the first claim follows by inspection. The second claim is obtained by observing that anything which increases the left-hand side of (35) must reduce K and so the attention paid to any signal. The third claim is by inspection. Regarding the number of attention-receiving signals, the left-hand side of (35) is increasing in γ and κ 2 i for each i, and also falls as c (·) falls. Hence the solution K (and so the number of attention-grabbing signals) decreases with γ and κ i for each i but falls as c (·) rises. Finally, as γ approaches one from below, K converges to a lower boundK. IfK > ξ 1 then the left-hand side of (35) diverges, and so the equality cannot hold. Hence it must be the case thatK = ξ 1 , which means that K must fall below ξ 2 for 1 − γ sufficiently small, and so all signals i > 1 are ignored for γ close enough to one.
Proof of Proposition 3. Contrary to the proposition, suppose that players ignore the ith information source (so that z i = 0) while listening to source i + 1 (so that z i+1 > 0). Now
The first inequality holds because z i+1 > 0; the second is from the convexity of c i+1 (·); and the third inequality holds by assumption. This implies ξ < K i , which contradicts z i = 0.
Combine the equalities from (13) to obtain
This also holds for z i = 0. Treating Ψ as a constant, the right-hand side of the first equation in (37) is decreasing in z i and so (37) yields a unique solution z i = f i (γ, κ 2 i , ξ i , Ψ) for some function f i (·). That solution is increasing in γ, but decreasing in κ 2 i , and Ψ. Given this, the second equation in (37) can be written
Given the observations made so far, the right-hand side of this equation is decreasing in Ψ, and so (38) yields a unique solution for Ψ. The right-hand side is also increasing in γ and decreasing in κ 2 j for each j, and so the solution Ψ is respectively increasing and decreasing in these parameters. This property of Ψ is enough to establish the proposition's remaining claims. To see why, inspect (37) and notice that an information source i is ignored if and only if ξ i Ψ c i (0) > 1. If γ is increased or κ 2 j is reduced, then the consequent increase in Ψ strengthens this inequality and so information source i continues to be ignored.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the cost specification C(z) = c( n j=1 z j ) and an information source satisfying z i > 0. Differentiate the solution for z i stated in Proposition 2 to obtain
and so attention falls with γ if and only if the clarity of an information source is sufficiently poor. However, in equilibrium the correlation coefficient ρ i of a signal is monotonic in its clarity:
Turning to the specification C(z) = n j=1 c j (z j ), use (37) for z i > 0 to obtain
Now, z i is decreasing in γ if and only the right-hand side is decreasing in γ when z i is fixed. Differentiating the right-hand side yields
The term specific to i is monotonic in the correlation coefficient
where the last step uses the fact that Ψ is increasing in γ. This final equality holds if and only if ρ i is sufficiently small; that is, if and only if the information source is relatively private.
For the next three proofs, the notation m indicates the number of active information sources; hence z i > 0 for i ≤ m but z i = 0 for all i > m, where signals have been ordered appropriately.
Proof of Proposition 5. The first claims follow from arguments given in the proof of Proposition 4. To establish that Z = n j=1 z j is decreasing in γ, suppose (for the purpose of contradiction) that it is not. Summing the expression in (39) for dz i /dγ across the m active information sources and re-arranging, total attention Z is increasing in γ if and only if
Inspecting (35), note that Z is the argument of the c (·) term. Hence if Z is increasing in γ then the squared term must be decreasing in γ. This is so if and only if
Combining the two inequalities of (44) and (45) gives the single inequality
The final expression is positive, which generates the desired contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 6. Setting
where the solution for σ 2 i applies and is needed only for i ≤ m. Hence
Given the cost assumptions, the equation (35) determining K becomes
.
Substituting K back into var[a | θ] yields, after some algebraic simplification,
This is increasing in γ if γ > −1, which is a maintained parameter restriction of the model. Turning to the pairwise covariance between players' actions,
where K has been substituted as before. By inspection, this covariance is increasing in γ. This covariance is the variance of the average action, conditional on the state θ:
The variance of a player's action conditional on this average is also readily calculated:
and this is decreasing in γ. The correlation coefficient of action across players (conditional on θ) iŝ
Differentiating with respect to γ:
For 1 − γ small enough, m = 1 and so B = 0 and so this inequality holds. Fixing A and B, the inequality strengthens as γ falls. The only remaining case is when m increases following a fall in γ, so that A and B both change. However, straightforward but long and tedious algebraic manipulations confirm that such an increase in m serves to strengthen the inequality.
Proof of Proposition 7. Write ψ i ≡ 1/σ 2 i where σ 2 i = κ 2 i + (ξ 2 i /z i ) for the precision of the ith signal. The precision of a player's posterior beliefs about θ is
The proposition's claim, therefore, is that m j=1 ψ j is decreasing in γ. Taking σ 2 i from (47), differentiating ψ i with respect to γ, substituting in the derivative of K with respect to γ obtained from differentiating the expression for K stated in (49), and re-arranging yields
Hence m j=1 ψ j is decreasing in γ if and only if
This inequality involves two products, the jkth elements of which cancel from both sides whenever j = k. Consider j = k. Collecting together the terms on either side in a typical such jkth element, a sufficient condition for the above inequality is that, for all j and k,
Suppose first that ξ j > ξ k , then dividing by the (positive) common element simplifies this inequality to ξ j (K − γξ k ) 2 > ξ k (K − γξ j ) 2 . Multiplying out, cancelling the common component and collecting terms again simplifies further to (ξ j − ξ k )K 2 > (ξ j − ξ k )γ 2 ξ j ξ k . Given that ξ j > ξ k has been assumed, the first term on each side can be cancelled and the result is true if K > ξ j (for γ > −1, which is assumed throughout). But, since z j > 0 for such j, K is certainly larger than ξ j . Finally, when ξ j < ξ k , the penultimate two inequalities both reverse (returning exactly the same final inequality) and the result holds once more, since K > ξ k .
Set ζ = 1 without loss of generality. The covariance of interest is 
and so ρ i > ρ j ⇔ ξ i < ξ j
is confirmed by straightforward algebra. Now, the differential of the covariance can be written
whereρ = (K −ξ)/(K − γξ). Thus, collecting together the terms in the summation again,
where the latter statement follows from Proposition 7. Recall √ c = 1, and so, using (49) Proof of Lemma 2. There is now a proper prior θ ∼ N (θ, 2 ), and so a proper prior about the n × 1 vectorx. Abusing notation, so thatθ is also an n×1 vector with identical entries equal to the scalar θ, and 2 is an n × n matrix with every element equal to the scalar 2 ,x ∼ N (θ, 2 + K) where K ≡ diag[κ 2 ] is an n × n diagonal matrix with ith diagonal element κ 2 i . Now, by definition, signal observations are distributed 
Dealing with the individual components, Ξ −1 = diag[z /ξ 2 ]. The Sherman-Morrison formula for updating rank-one updates of invertible matrices yields
where notation is again abused: is an n × 1 vector (as well as the corresponding scalar). Let
The determinant 
Considering each of these components in turn,
Also,
and
Noting that pre-and post-multiplication by the vector essentially sums the elements of the quadratic-form matrix while scaling by 2 ,
Similarly, 1 + K −1 = 1 + 2 n i=1 1 κ 2 i . Now consider det [var[x] ]. This can be obtained by eliminating Ξ −1 from (78), or equivalently ignoring z i terms in (79), and hence in (80) and (81):
Comparing the posterior and prior determinants, and following some simplification,
which yields (19), as required.
Proof of Lemma 3. Follows from the arguments used to derive Lemma 1, and subsequent arguments and discussion given in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 8. Differentiate L(z) from (25) with respect to z to obtain:
L (z) = [(1 − γ)( 2 + κ 2 )z + 1](1 − γ) 2 2 κ 2 − (1 − γ) 2 2 ((1 − γ)κ 2 z + 1)( 2 + κ 2 ) [(1 − γ)( 2 + κ 2 )z + 1] 2 + c(κ 2 + 2 ) 1 + (κ 2 + 2 )z = c(κ 2 + 2 ) 1 + (κ 2 + 2 )z − ((1 − γ) 2 ) 2 [(1 − γ)( 2 + κ 2 )z + 1] 2 = Q(z) [(1 − γ)( 2 + κ 2 )z + 1] 2 [1 + (κ 2 + 2 )z]
The sign of L (z) is determined by the Q(z), which is a convex quadratic. Any interior minimiser of L(z) must satisfy Q(z) = 0 where Q(z) is increasing. The unique candidate for this is the largest root of Q(z). (There is also an interior maximiser at the smaller root of Q(z). If this is positive, then, given the discussion in the text, it could form part of an equilibrium.) There is also the possibility of a boundary solution at z = 0, which requires Q(0) > 0. Evaluating at z = 0, Q(0) = (κ 2 + 2 ) c − ((1 − γ) 2 ) 2 κ 2 + 2 and Q (0) = (κ 2 + 2 ) 2 2(1 − γ)c − ((1 − γ) 2 ) 2 κ 2 + 2 .
(85) From (26), recall thatc = ((1 − γ) 2 ) 2 /(κ 2 + 2 ).
Begin by supposing that γ < 1 2 . From (85), if c >c then Q(0) > 0 and so L(z) is locally increasing at zero. Hence, z = 0 is a local minimiser. 2(1 − γ)c >c, and so Q (0) > 0, which means that the quadratic Q(z) is increasing for all positive z. This means that there can be no positive solution to Q(z), and so z = 0 is the unique minimiser, and so there is a unique equilibrium. If c <c then Q(0) < 0, and so z = 0 cannot be an equilibrium. Moreover, beginning from Q(0) < 0 there is only one positive solution to Q(z) = 0 and so only one local minimiser of Q(z).
Next suppose that γ > 1 2 . If c <c then Q(0) < 0, and the argument in the previous paragraph applies: there is a unique and positive local minimiser of Q(z), and so a unique equilibrium. Similarly, if c >c/(2(1 − γ)) >c then there is a solution at z = 0 (because Q(0) > 0) but no positive solution (because Q (0) > 0). The remaining case is whenc < c <c/(2(1 − γ)). Q(z) begins at Q(0) > 0 (so there is a local minimiser at z = 0) but is decreasing, and so there is the possibility of two roots of Q(z) at positive values of z. The existence of such roots is guaranteed when Q(0) is close enough to zero, which holds when c is close enough toc.
Proof of Proposition 9. Without loss, set ξ 2 i = 1 for all i. It is useful to perform the change of variables y i = z i κ 2 i . There is no loss in doing so, since choosing y i is equivalent to choosing z i . With this change in hand, the mutual information between x andx satisfies 2 I(x ,x) = log(1 + 2 Y ) +
Differentiating this with respect to both y i and (1/κ 2 i ) yields ∂C(y) ∂y i = c (I(x ,x)) 2 (1 + 2 Y )(1 + y i ) .
The change of variable ensures that the beauty-contest loss function L (z) becomes
Differentiating this with respect to both y i and (1/κ 2 i ) yields ∂L (y) 
